PIT Overload Analysis in Content Centric Networks by Virgilio, Matteo et al.
Politecnico di Torino
Porto Institutional Repository
[Proceeding] PIT Overload Analysis in Content Centric Networks
Original Citation:
Virgilio M., Marchetto G., Sisto R. (2013). PIT Overload Analysis in Content Centric Networks.
In: ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Information-Centric Networking (ICN 2013), Hong Kong, China,
August 12, 2013. pp. 67-72
Availability:
This version is available at : http://porto.polito.it/2513861/ since: September 2013
Publisher:
ACM
Published version:
DOI:10.1145/2491224.2491225
Terms of use:
This article is made available under terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Article
("Public - All rights reserved") , as described at http://porto.polito.it/terms_and_conditions.
html
Porto, the institutional repository of the Politecnico di Torino, is provided by the University Library
and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to all the world. Please share with us how
this access benefits you. Your story matters.
(Article begins on next page)
	  This is an author’s version of the paper 
Virgilio M., Marchetto G., Sisto R. 
“PIT Overload Analysis in Content Centric Networks” 
Published in 
ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Information-Centric Networking (ICN 2013), pp. 67-72 
The final published version is accessible from here: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2491224.2491225 
 
 
©2013 ACM. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from ACM must be obtained for all 
other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising 
or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or 
reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. 
PIT Overload Analysis in Content Centric Networks
Matteo Virgilio
Department of Control and
Computer Engineering
Politecnico di Torino
matteo.virgilio@polito.it
Guido Marchetto
Department of Control and
Computer Engineering
Politecnico di Torino
guido.marchetto@polito.it
Riccardo Sisto
Department of Control and
Computer Engineering
Politecnico di Torino
riccardo.sisto@polito.it
ABSTRACT
Content Centric Networking represents a paradigm shift in
the evolution and definition of modern network protocols.
Many research efforts have been made with the purpose of
proving the feasibility and the scalability of this proposal.
Our main contribution is to provide an analysis of the Pend-
ing Interest Table memory requirements in real deployment
scenarios, especially considering the impact of distributed
denial of service attacks. In fact, the state that the pro-
tocol maintains for each resource request makes the routers
more prone to resources exhaustion issues than in traditional
stateless solutions. Our results are derived by using a full
custom simulator and considering the different node archi-
tectures that have been proposed as valid reference models.
The main outcomes point out differentiated weaknesses in
each architecture we investigated and underline the need for
improvements in terms of security and scalability.
Keywords
Content Centric Networking, Security, DDoS attacks, Sim-
ulation
1. INTRODUCTION
Content Centric Networking (CCN) [7] is emerging as one
of the possible dominant paradigms for the future network
architecture. Starting from the valid claim that in a content
distribution network it is actually important to address re-
sources themselves, rather than their physical location, CCN
aims to change the traditional network operation by mak-
ing all network devices name-aware. Then, routing decisions
are taken according to the name of the resource the user is
requesting.
The approach is promising and may represent one of the
most significant innovations in the networking field. How-
ever, its new operating mode opens the path for possible
issues and threats that were not present in the traditional
network. These have to be properly investigated in order
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to have an exhaustive evaluation of the overall CCN archi-
tecture. For example, content delivery is based on a status
information (the requested URI) that has to be maintained
at nodes in the so called Pending Interest Table (PIT). This
may pose strict constraints in terms of reliability and scal-
ability. In fact, this table may overflow, with consequent
service disruption and possible network collapse. Further-
more, these constraints might be even exploited by attackers
in order to slow down or even interrupt the normal network
operation.
In this paper we deal with this specific problem by providing
a performance evaluation of some possible PIT architectures
in terms of resilience to (possibly malicious) overload con-
ditions. In particular, we consider three PIT architectures,
referenced in the available CCN literature: (i) a PIT storing
all the bytes composing an URI, which we call SimplePIT;
(ii) a PIT storing a fixed length entry for an URI, which we
call HashedPIT; (iii) a PIT implemented through multiple
Bloom Filters placed in each router interface, as described
in [18]. This solution is known as DiPIT.
The experiments are conducted by means of an ad-hoc sim-
ulator, designed to recreate the behavior of a CCN network
and to track memory usage at CCN nodes. In order to ob-
tain significant results, the simulator implements the topol-
ogy of a prominent Italian ISP. The paper has the following
structure: Section 2 briefly introduces CCN and its architec-
ture. Section 3 dives into PIT overloading issues, explaining
the importance of this problem in the CCN context. Sec-
tion 4 offers an overview of the related work in this field.
Section 5 introduces our experimental analysis and presents
the obtained results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper
and also presents some possible future work.
2. CONTENT CENTRIC NETWORKING
Content Centric Networking (CCN) relies on two main
types of packets: Interest packets and Data packets. The
former are used by clients to request a (piece of) resource.
They include the content name, in the form of a Uniform Re-
source Identifier (URI), plus a set of parameters useful for
Interest processing. The latter are transmitted as responses
to client requests and are used to deliver pieces of data.
One of the key features of the CCN architecture is the cach-
ing capability. A CCN node, e.g., an edge router, can store
Data packets in its local repository and autonomously serve
future requests for that content, without forwarding ahead
Interest packets. This possibly leads to a reduced latency
time experienced by clients and to a lower bandwidth usage.
In order to correctly deliver data, CCN nodes are equipped
with three data structures: (i) The Content Store (CS),
which is the area where Data packets are cached. Each In-
terest arrival causes a Content Store lookup: if the requested
name is present in the store, the response is immediately
generated; (ii) The Pending Interest Table (PIT), which is
the data structure where routers annotate forwarded Inter-
ests and the respective arrival interfaces. Multiple Interests
for the same URI are aggregated in a single entry (Interest
merging) to improve the system scalability; (iii) The For-
warding Information Base (FIB), which is the equivalent of
the IP routing table. When a client generates an Interest,
each router in the path towards the destination adds an en-
try in its PIT. In this way, devices readily forward packets
to the right hosts when the response comes back. The entry
remains in the PIT for a time interval called LifeTime, which
is specified in the Interest itself. If the LifeTime expires and
the response has not yet arrived, the memory is released.
Notice that this parameter is chosen by clients. Hence, at
least according to the current CCN rules, it is not under the
network control.
3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The PIT is the fundamental structure used to maintain
the state of each active flow. It grows with users sending
their Interests and shrinks when Data packets arrive at the
router. Considering the access speed required for such a
structure and the possibilities offered in this sense by cur-
rent memory technologies, the PIT size might represent a
bottleneck for the entire CCN infrastructure.
The problem might be exacerbated by a massive usage of
long Interest LifeTimes, which would further increase the
number of simultaneous entries in the PIT. Despite the pull
nature of CCN, this possibility cannot be excluded as it
would be necessary for supporting publish/subscribe ser-
vices [6] where users subscribe for a given content that will
be asynchronously produced in the future. Many of these
services are implemented, for example, by means of HTTP
long polling strategies, which make extensive use of long (po-
tentially unanswered) requests. [9] presents a complete dis-
cussion on the best practices about timer setting and on how
’long’ these requests should be. In general, 30 s is considered
a safe value, as longer timers may be undesirable for inter-
mediate proxies placed between the server and the client.
However, solutions with longer values are widely adopted
in common web applications (e.g.,FaceBook and some web-
based mail applications, which to our experience often use
timers of more than one minute). In addition to that, we
have to consider that one or more malicious users could craft
artificial requests with the purpose of filling the available
PIT memory on routers, thus implementing a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
With PIT overflow, users would see their Interests discarded
by routers and, consequently, they would experience an in-
creasing rate of retransmissions until the network completely
collapses. With this problem in mind, some possible PIT
architectures have been proposed with the aim of reducing
the required table size. A first simple solution [7] is to re-
alize the PIT by means of a hash-table, where each URI is
encoded using a fixed number of bits. Other possible so-
lutions deploy more complex architectures. For example,
[3] proposes a tree-like structure to arrange the PIT entries
in order to also ensure high lookup, insertion, and deletion
speed, while [18] presents a very efficient PIT architecture
based on Bloom Filters.
While these solutions may be effective during normal oper-
ation, performance degradation might be experienced when
the system is under the abovementioned DDoS attacks. This
kind of attack may be implemented by distributedly gener-
ating Interest packets that contain a valid destination prefix
but non-existing resource names, so that routers properly
forward Interests and store new entries in their PITs, but
responses never come back. The destination might possi-
bly be colluded with the attacker and simply drop incoming
packets. In order to maximize the impact of the attack, a
malicious user could request always different resources thus
avoiding Interest merging. Furthermore, the attacker could
also select large values for the LifeTime field. Figure 1 shows
Figure 1: Attack scenario
a very simple network consisting of three routers, an attacker
(or, equivalently, a bot net), a normal client and a bad des-
tination, which is placed ad hoc by the attacker. The role
of the bot net is that of generating Interests towards the
fake destination. Routers along the dashed path (R1 and
R2) are flooded with unanswered Interests, which indeed in-
creases their memory usage.
This paper presents an analysis of the PIT resilience to pos-
sible overload and consequent service disruption. A compre-
hensive simulation study of the possible PIT architectures is
done in order to evaluate their performance from this per-
spective.
4. RELATEDWORK
The feasibility of the CCN approach with regard to the
amount of requested resources at nodes, together with a
proper CCN node dimensioning, has been recently object
of a wide research activity. For example, [2] presents an effi-
cient router design and describes some possible usage scenar-
ios. Designing an efficient forwarding plane is also the sub-
ject of [19], which identifies key issues related to the protocol
fast speed implementation and establishes some principles to
be observed in order to design scalable forwarding architec-
tures. Furthermore, [11] presents a feasibility study of CCN
and concludes that CCN nodes based on current technolo-
gies would still be unable to sustain requests arrival rates at
the Internet scale. However, they can sustain rates at Con-
tent Distribution Network and small ISP scale. Specifically
concerning the PIT dimensioning problem, two recent pa-
pers propose different architectures conceived for reducing
the PIT size. As also described in the previous section, [3]
proposes a tree-like PIT structure, while [18] present a PIT
architecture based on Bloom Filters. However, both papers
do not provide a quantitative evaluation of the PIT overload
problem and do not consider possible DDoS attacks.
Concerning the security threats in a CCN network, the avail-
able literature mainly covers privacy, data authentication,
and data integrity issues. For example, [15] addresses the
privacy problem deriving from the stateful operation of CCN
routers, while data authentication and integrity have been
considered since the seminal CCN papers [7, 8]. Instead, a
comprehensive study of the possible PIT overload issue de-
riving from a DDoS attack is missing. [4] presents a solution
to mitigate these attacks, while the ongoing work by Gasti
et al. [12] gives an introductive overview of the problem and
of some ongoing experiments. Hence, the available informa-
tion is somewhat complementary to the results of this paper,
which provides a quantitative evaluation of the resilience of
some proposed PIT architectures to this kind of attack.
5. PIT RESILIENCE ANALYSIS
This section focuses on the evaluation of the PIT resilience
to possible overload. Our analysis is performed by simula-
tion and considers three possible PIT architectures: (i) a
PIT storing all the bytes that compose an URI, referred to as
SimplePIT; (ii) a PIT storing fixed length entries evaluated
as hash values of the URIs, referred to as HashedPIT; (iii)
a PIT implemented through multiple Bloom Filters placed
in each router interface, as described in [18]. This last so-
lutions is known as DiPIT. The PIT architecture presented
in [3] is not explicitly investigated here as it shares with the
HashedPIT the same principle of introducing fixed length
entries (in [3] the numerical codes that make up the logical
tree structure are reduced to fixed length).
While in the first two cases PIT overloading can be mea-
sured in terms of memory occupancy, with possible memory
overflow, in the latter case this is not possible as the DiPIT
is based on Counting Bloom Filters, where memory occu-
pancy is constant. In essence, the filter fills the entire mem-
ory size and each Interest is encoded in a sequence of ’1s’ to
be added at given positions of the filter. In this case, PIT
overloading results in a high rate of the so called false posi-
tive events, namely, the node erroneously concludes that an
Interest is present in the filter and either does not propagate
it or erroneously removes some entries from the PIT when
a chunk is received. In both cases this results in a degra-
dation of the service perceived, as both events require one
or more Interest retransmissions. [18] proposes an effective
combination of filters to reduce the false positive probabil-
ity during normal operation (see [18] for further details), but
this may increase when the network is under attack. In or-
der to quantitatively evaluate the effect of false positives and
also enable a coherent comparison among the three consid-
ered PIT architectures, we base our analysis on the average
percentage of Interest retransmissions that occur at users’
machines. This is clearly proportional to the average down-
load time they experience, and hence it is a metric of the
overall network performance.
A further issue to address is the selection of a proper simu-
lator complying with the requirements of our study. Some
CCN simulators are available, but all are customized for spe-
Figure 2: Telecom Italia topology
cific analyses. For example, ccnSim [5] has been designed
mainly for the evaluation of cache replacement techniques
and hence is not optimized for experimenting on the PIT
management. Hence, in order to focus our analysis on PIT
issues and meet our specific requirements, we developed a
full custom event-driven Java simulator1.
5.1 Simulation scenario
With the main aim of obtaining significant and quanti-
tative results, the network configuration and user behavior
models are refined to faithfully recreate realistic scenarios.
In particular, we adopt as a reference the network of Telecom
Italia, a prominent Italian ISP. Data related to the Telecom
Italia network that are of interest in this context are pub-
licly available on the web.
First of all, the topology adopted in our simulations repro-
duces the real structure of the Telecom Italia network [16]
(see Figure 2, represented at Point of Presence (PoP) gran-
ularity). The network is divided in two areas: the first one
that covers Northern Italy and the second one that covers
central and Southern Italy. PoPs are almost equally divided
between the Northern and the Southern areas and in our
simulator each PoP is represented by a router. This topol-
ogy is typical also of many ISPs in Europe.
Concerning the network population, we adopt the number
of broadband Internet subscriptions currently active in the
Telecom Italia network — around 9 million — available in
the ISP investor relation [17]. We also assume the topologi-
cal distribution of users among the ISP PoPs to be directly
proportional to the geographical distribution of the ISP cus-
tomers. This allows us to accurately reproduce the download
traffic pattern of the ISP users. Furthermore, access band-
widths are considered uniform for simplicity and equal to 7
Mbps (download) and 1 Mbps (upload), which are the val-
ues characterizing a large percentage of Telecom Italia users.
The overall header size of the protocols underlying CCN is
assumed fixed to 20 bytes.
Regarding the selection of the content to be retrieved by
1The NS-3 based NdnSIM CCN simulator [1] was not yet
available when we started our project, but we plan to move
to that environment for our future work on this topic
clients, we assume a Zipf- Mandelbrot probability distribu-
tion, which Saleh et al. [14] proved to properly model the
behavior of users in a content distribution P2P network.
Given the content delivery nature of a CCN network, this
probability distribution could reasonably model the user be-
havior also in our case. According to the Zipf’s Law and
given the total number of resources in the network, which
are uniformly distributed among per-PoP content providers,
the corresponding distribution function is expressed as fol-
lows:
p(i) =
1
(i+ q)α
∀i ∈ [1, N ]
where p(i) is the probability of extracting the i-th content
available in the network, q and α are two parameters that
[14] fixed to α = 0.55, q = 25 for a residential ISP (as Tele-
com Italia is), and N is the total amount of resources.
Download requests are modeled using a Poisson process with
average rate equal to 500 requests per second. This results
in an average value of around 12 million simultaneously ac-
tive downloads in the steady state. We believe this network
load is even higher than that observed in a 9 million users
network during normal operation and hence it is significant
for our study.
Another key parameter for our evaluation is the memory
availability at CCN nodes. Reasonable values for the PIT
size that match both the required memory access speed and
current memory technologies are some hundreds of MB [18],
available by means of the SRAM technology. In order to
be more conservative and also with the aim of analyzing a
possible near future scenario, we fix the PIT size to 1 GB.
In the DiPIT case, this value refers to the overall available
filters memory (the PITs plus the shared Bloom filter).
Concerning the attack parameters, we consider a maximum
aggregate attack bandwidth of 4 Gb/s, which is a realistic
value for a medium scale ISP such as Telecom Italia [13], and
Interest LifeTimes values that vary between 4 s (the default
value considered in the CCNx [10], the prototypal imple-
mentation of CCN node) and 180 s. Notice that those are
reasonable LifeTime values if we think to enable complete
publish/subscribe services in a CCN network, as discussed
in Section 3.
5.2 Results
This section reports on the simulation results obtained for
the three considered PIT architectures: the SimplePIT, the
HashedPIT and the DiPIT. We consider a distributed bot
net sending Interests to fake destinations connected to the
Rome edge router. Hence, our analysis focuses on the Rome
PoP as it is the most overloaded node. In essence, we keep
track of the memory usage at the Rome PoP. Furthermore,
we also measure the average percentage of retransmissions
experienced by users, as depicted above.
5.2.1 I scenario - SimplePIT
In the first scenario, we consider to deploy a SimplePIT
at each router. This PIT implementation stores the entire
URI in the memory so it is the simplest architecture we can
think of. In order to maximize transmission efficiency, and
consequently maximize attack impact, it is important for the
attackers to craft very long URIs. We selected 1000 bytes
in our simulation. In particular, each malicious URI has a
valid 13 bytes prefix (e.g. /it/badPubRm/ required for
reaching the destination) and a non-existing resource name
whose length is set to a randomly selected string of 1000
bytes.
Simulation results concerning the memory occupancy at the
Rome PoP and the related retransmission rate are shown
in Table 1 for several values of the overall bot net band-
width and of the fake Interest LifeTimes (retransmissions
are referred only to finished downloads). Users do not ex-
perience a considerable retransmission rate until the PIT is
completely full. However, by increasing either the overall
attack bandwidth or the Interest LifeTime, routers start to
be unable to correctly handle incoming traffic and all the
connections are significantly slowed down.
These results can be analytically justified. Let us consider
the following case as an example (we recall that the overall
headers of underlying protocols is fixed to 20 bytes in our
simulations):
Battackers = 2 Gbps, LifeT ime = 4sec (1)
|Interest|attackers = 1033 bytes(
URI︷︸︸︷
1013 +
HEADER︷︸︸︷
20 )(2)
The number of Interests per second generated by the bot
net can be calculated in the following manner:
(2 ∗ 109) bps
(1033 ∗ 8) bits ≡ 242013
Interest
sec
(3)
Considering a 4 s LifeTime, we obtain:
≈ 242013 ∗ 4 = 968.052 entries⇒ ≈ 980MB occupied (4)
which is consistent with our simulation result.
5.2.2 II scenario - HashedPIT
In the second scenario, we consider the HashedPIT, na-
mely, a centralized hash table storing a fixed length entry
for each URI in transit. We exploit the SHA-1 hashing al-
gorithm in order to ensure a negligible collision rate. In this
context, the best size for an attacker’s URI is 20 bytes, ac-
cording to the SHA-1 output digest (160 bits). Longer URIs
are useless as would be reduced to 20 byte strings by CCN
nodes. In this case the resultant attackers transmission effi-
ciency, here intended as the amount of transmitted data that
will be stored in the PIT with respect to the total traffic gen-
erated by the host, is around 50% due to the non-negligible
underlying header size (20 byte headers in our simulations
lead to 20 / (20+20) = 50 % transmission efficiency). Since
in the previous case the efficiency was about 98% (1013 byte
long URIs lead to 1013 / (1013 + 20) ≈ 98% ), one could
infer that an attacker has simply to double its bandwidth to
get the same impact of the SimplePIT case. This is only par-
tially confirmed by simulation results presented in Table 1.
We can observe how, as expected, the memory occupancy
is halved at equal simulation conditions and, consequently,
the retransmission rate grows slowly with the increase of the
attack intensity. However, it is worth noticing the greater
attack effectiveness when the PIT is almost completely full
with respect to the previous case. Such a situation here pre-
vents users from finishing any downloads and the number
of retransmissions tends to infinite, namely, no useful data
are received by clients, who continue to retransmit Inter-
ests: the network is completely unusable. The infinite value
in Table 1 just represents the situation in which no stable
value is reached for the number of retransmitted packet from
the client point of view. This is due to the fact that the first
Attack settings
SimplePIT HashedPIT DiPIT
Retransmissions RAM Usage Retransmissions RAM Usage Retransmissions RAM Usage
Band = 100 Mbps 0 ≈ 49 MB 0 ≈ 25 MB % ≈ 0.01 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 4 sec
Band = 500 Mbps 0 ≈ 245 MB 0 ≈ 125 MB ≈ 2.42 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 4 sec
Band = 2 Gbps 0 ≈ 980 MB 0 ≈ 500 MB ≈ 87.6 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 4 sec
Band = 4 Gbps ≈ 15 % ≈ FULL ≈ 83 % ≈ FULL ≈ 90 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 4 sec
Band = 100 Mbps 0 ≈ 735 MB 0 ≈ 375 MB ≈ 21 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 60 sec
Band = 100 Mbps ≈ 37 % ≈ FULL 0 ≈ 750 MB ≈ 86 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 120 sec
Band = 100 Mbps ≈ 52 % ≈ FULL ∞ ≈ FULL ≈ 88 % 1 GB
LifeTime = 180 sec
Table 1: PITs performance evaluation
data structure is more complex to overfill as stored Interests
are of highly variable length and attackers do not have exact
information of the amount of memory that is still available
at routers. Hence, when the PIT is almost full many attack-
ers’ fake Interests are discarded as they are too large with
respect to the available space. Some shorter users’ Inter-
est can instead be accommodated and hence the network is
still able to operate, although with a significantly reduced
efficiency. In the HashedPIT case, instead, 20 bytes is al-
ways the best choice for URI length so the attack is more
effective and destructive. This clearly does not mean that
the SimplePIT can be considered resilient to DDoS attacks
as specific attacker techniques may be adopted to possibly
saturate the PIT. This analysis is left for future work.
5.2.3 III scenario - DiPIT
The last scenario refers to a very different PIT and router
architecture. The central PIT is split into multiple smaller
per-interface PITs, each implemented by a Counting Bloom
Filter data structure. The specific description of this pro-
posal and the algorithm adopted is available in [18]. The
retransmissions observed in this case are due to the Bloom
Filter false positive events, as described above in this sec-
tion. The probability for a Bloom Filter to return a false
positive may be approximately evaluated2 as (1− e− k∗nm )k,
where k is the number of hash functions deployed to code a
given element, n is the number of elements currently in the
filter, and m is the total size of the filter. In our simulator
each Bloom Filter is modeled by means of this probability
function. Furthermore, the specific architecture based on
different filters and the insertion/deletion algorithms pre-
sented in [18] are reproduced in order to obtain consistent
results.
In [18], the authors also suggest possible values for k, which
vary according to the Interest arrival rate that the router has
to support. We set this value to 4 hash functions because
larger values are not suitable for high-end routers. For the
Bloom Filter, we assume for simplicity 8 bit counters and
no counter overflow. Simulation results are presented in Ta-
ble 1. It is worth noticing how although the DiPIT does not
suffer from memory overflow (neglecting counter overflow),
2Assuming independence for the probabilities of each bit
being set.
false positive events become a truly limiting factor when
the network is under attack and many entries are inserted
into the filter. In fact, considerable retransmission rates are
observed also with non-huge attack intensities.
5.3 Discussion
These simulation results lead us to a twofold conclusion.
First, none of the analyzed PIT architectures is overloaded
during normal operation in the considered network scenario.
Even with a low intensity attack, memory usage is reason-
able and no retransmissions are observed. This in some way
confirms that even a traditional SimplePIT-based solution
might be currently deployed at ISP scale, as also concluded
by the analysis in [11]. However, second, there are signif-
icant weaknesses in all the architectures when the attack
intensity grows.
To summarize our results, Figure 3 plots the number of
pending downloads in the network over time for some ref-
erence values of attack bandwidth B and fake Interest Life-
Time. In Figure 3(a), the considered attack intensity leads
this number to slowly diverge with a similar trend for both
the HashedPIT and DiPIT based nodes. For the SimplePIT
we do not observe a significant gap with respect to the sys-
tem behavior during normal operation. Figure 3(b) consid-
ers a more critical scenario: B=100 Mbps, LifeTime=180 s
and also B=4 Gbps, Lifetime=30 s for the SimplePIT. We
can observe how the SimplePIT is only partially affected in
this second case, while the system fast exits the steady state
due to retransmission rate divergence when the HashedPIT
is deployed. We can conclude that the HashedPIT is the ar-
chitecture most affected by the considered attack, while the
SimplePIT is the architecture most resilient for the reasons
explained above. The DiPIT has an intermediate behavior.
Clearly, these results hold in our attack scenario. Starting
from this point, one could design other specific attacker be-
haviors that even worsen the perceived service, especially for
the SimplePIT. For example, an attacker may: (i) combine
broad bandwidth and higher LifeTime to increase attack
effectiveness; (ii) distribute more zombies around the net-
work to avoid attack source detection; (iii) exploit more bad
prefixes in order to make any countermeasures even more
complex to deploy. This is a non-exhaustive list that fur-
ther motivates the real need for proper countermeasures to
DDoS in a CCN network.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Network performance evaluation
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This paper compares the existing PIT architectures with
the aim of providing a quantitative evaluation of their re-
silience to overload conditions, especially when these are
due to DDoS attacks. Our results show how all architec-
tures are affected by these attacks and hence further stud-
ies are needed to figure out possible countermeasures. One
can be, for example, the introduction of smarter algorithms
for LifeTime management at content routers, which adapt
LifeTimes as a function of the network load: a router can
grant larger LifeTime values in case of low traffic conges-
tion and, conversely, implement a sort of LifeTime shaping
when the load increases. With such a mechanism, we would
break down the hypothesis that intermediate nodes do not
manage LifeTime values as well as PIT entries removal (for
example by discarding the ones which have a too long expira-
tion time). Other mechanisms could be based on an Interest
RED (Random Early Discard) strategy based on the amount
of occupied memory. The higher the congestion, the larger
is the probability of discarding an incoming Interest. This
would call for a complete performance comparison with ex-
isting mechanisms that, in the context of IP networks, drop
packets to handle traffic congestion. Last but not least, it
is necessary to figure out possible strategies to detect and
drop malicious Interests. These and other possible mecha-
nisms will be subject of our future work. We will perform a
quantitative evaluation of all of them, also considering their
complexity in terms of additional computing and memory
resource needs.
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Prof. Luigi Ciminiera,
who had a fundamental role in starting up this work.
8. REFERENCES
[1] A. Afanasyev, I. Moiseenko, and L. Zhang. ndnsim:
Ndn simulator for ns-3. Technical Report, NDN-0005,
Oct. 2012.
[2] S. Arianfar, P. Nikander, and J. Ott. On
content-centric router design and implications. In
ReARCH ’10, Philadelphia, PA, USA, Nov. 2010.
[3] H. Dai, B. Liu, Y. Chen, and Y. Wang. On pending
interest table in named data networking. In ANCS
’12, Austin, TX, USA, Oct. 2012.
[4] Huichen Dai, Yi Wang, Jindou Fan, and Bin Liu.
Mitigate ddos attacks in ndn by interest traceback. In
NOMEN ’13, Turin, Italy, Apr. 2013.
[5] D.Rossi and G. Rossini. Caching performance of
content centric networks under multi-path routing
(and more). Technical Report, Telecom Paris Tech,
2011.
[6] P.Th. Eugster, P. A. Felber, R. Guerraoui, and
A. Kermarrec. The many faces of publish/subscribe.
ACM Computing Surveys, 35:114–131, 2003.
[7] V. Jacobson, D. K. Smetters, N. H. Briggs, M. F.
Plass, P. Stewart, J. D. Thornton, and R. L.
Braynard. Networking named content. In CoNEXT
’09, Rome, Italy, Dec. 2009.
[8] V. Jacobson, D. K. Smetters, N. H. Briggs, M. F.
Plass, P. Stewart, J. D. Thornton, and R. L.
Braynard. Voccn: Voice-over content-centric networks.
In ReArch ’09, Rome, Italy, Dec. 2009.
[9] S. Loreto, P. Saint-Andre, S. Salsano, and G. Wilkins.
Known issues and best practices for the use of long
polling and streaming in bidirectional http. RFC 6202,
Apr. 2011.
[10] PARC. Ccnx technical documentation.
http://www.ccnx.org/.
[11] D. Perino and M. Varvello. A reality check for content
centric networking. In ICN ’11, Toronto, Canada,
Aug. 2011.
[12] P.Gasti, G. Tsudik, E. Uzun, and L. Zhang. Dos &
ddos in named-data networking. arXiv:1208.0952,
Aug. 2012.
[13] Radware. Global application & network security
report. Annual Report, 2011.
[14] O. Saleh and M. Hefeeda. Modeling and caching of
peer-to-peer traffic. In ICNP ’06, Santa Barbara, CA,
USA, Nov. 2006.
[15] S.Arianfar, T. Koponen, B. Raghavan, and S. Shenker.
On preserving privacy in content-oriented networks. In
ICN ’11, Toronto, Canada, Aug. 2011.
[16] A. Soldati. Telecom italia ip backbone and peering
policies. In Italian Peering Forum (PFI 2008), 2008.
[17] Telecom Italia S.p.A. Resoconto intermedio di gestione
al 31 marzo 2012 (in italian).
http://1q2012.telecomitalia.com/
attachments/telecomitalia2012q1it.pdf, 2012.
[18] W. You, B. Mathieu, P. Truong, J. Peltier, and
G. Simon. Dipit: a distributed bloom-filter based pit
table for ccn nodes. In ICCCN ’12, Munich, Germany,
July 2012.
[19] Haowei Yuan, Tian Song, and Patrick Crowley.
Scalable ndn forwarding: Concepts, issues and
principles. In ICCCN ’12, Munich, Germany, July
2012.
